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INTRODUCTION
Quasi-state, known as “pseudo states”, “de facto states”
or “unrecognized state” is not a mainstream discussion in
International Relations (IR) (Kolossov & O’Loughlin,
1998; Pegg, 1998; Kolsto, 2006). There are studies on the
individual state, but they are scattered and focus on ex-
plaining the particular case study itself without building a
systematic and coherent approach to study this case within
the framework of quasi-state. On the one hand, it is well
understood given that most of these states emerge from
separatist movements of the existing state – a process that
is contentious and often opposed by many as it is against
the internationally accepted norms of sovereignty and ter-
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Abstrak
Artikel ini bertujuan menganalisis diplomasi sebuah quasi-state dalam sengketa wilayah dengan menggunakan studi kasus Taiwan di Laut
Cina Selatan. Quasi-state bukan merupakan diskusi yang banyak diangkat dalam Hubungan Internasional sehingga konsep dan teorinya pun
belum berkembang secara baik. Meskipun demikian, dengan perkembangan globalisasi, keberadaan quasi-state menjadi semakin terlihat,
dan banyak diantaranya terlibat dalam sengketa yang solusinya memerlukan pemahaman tentang quasi-state tersebut, seperti yang terjadi di
Laut Cina Selatan. Artikel ini berargumen bahwa quasi-state memiliki kelemahan legal dan politik sehingga diplomasi quasi-state dapat dilihat
dengan menggunakan teori-teori diplomasi negara lemah, seperti diplomasi multi jalur untuk mengatasi kelemahan legalnya dan strategi
hedging untuk mengatasi kelemahan politiknya. Menggunakan pendekatan kualitatif berdasarkan sumber primer dan sekunder tentang
evolusi kebijakan Taiwan di Laut Cina Selatan, artikel ini berkesimpulan bahwa diplomasi Taiwan di Laut Cina Selatan pun mengikuti pola yang
sama.
Kata Kunci: diplomasi, quasi-state, sengketa wilayah, Taiwan, sengketa Laut Cina Selatan
Abstract
This study aims to examine the diplomacy of quasi-state in a territorial dispute by using the case of Taiwan in the South China Sea. The
discussion on quasi-state is not mainstream in International Relations, and thus its concept and theories are not well developed. By the rise
of globalization, however, quasi-states have a more active presence and that many parties involved in conflicts which resolutions require
understanding on quasi-state, including the South China Sea Disputes. This paper argues that quasi-state suffers from legal and political
weaknesses, and consequently, the diplomacy of quasi-state could be examined using theories on the diplomacy of weak states which
include multitrack diplomacy to deal with its legal weaknesses and hedging to deal with its political shortcomings. Employing a qualitative
method based on primary and secondary sources on Taiwan evolving policy on the South China Sea, this paper found that the diplomacy of
Taiwan in the South China Disputes also follows this pattern.
Keywords: diplomacy, South China Sea disputes, Taiwan, territorial disputes, quasi-state
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ritorial integrity. Thus, the lack of discussion on quasi-
state, at this point, mainly because it is not part and against
the preservation of the state system itself. The core con-
cept in IR – diplomacy - for example, entails the specific
reference to state conduct in dealing with other states in
searching for conf lict resolution. Thus, as Fiona
McConnell, Terri Moreau, and Jason Dittmer point out,
the term also strengthens “the discourse of recognition
and authority (re)performed by sovereign states to exclude
non-sovereign others” and thus making discussion on quasi-
state even submerged (McConnel, Moreau, & Dittmer,
2012).
On the other hand, however, this lack of knowledge
accumulation on a quasi-state is a disadvantage because as
a separate category of an actor in IR, quasi-state has unique
characteristics that make their behavior also unique com-
pared to state actors. Many have explored the legal conse-
quences of quasi-state in which these states have no for-
mal recognition from other countries, limited access to
the inter-governmental results, and limited access to an
international agreement. However, few in IR have explored
the political consequences from these legal circumstances
as to how do these states conduct “quasi-diplomacy” with
state actors to achieve their goal in the absence of all the
access as mentioned above? This question is not only in-
teresting but also valuable to understand the behavior of
quasi-states with a total of 34 states or almost one-fifth of
the total number of states based on calculation from 1945
to 2011 as the latest dataset indicated (Florea, 2014). The
question of quasi-state is even more critical especially in
the current globalization era whereby this process has of-
fered opportunities for new and non-state actors, to play a
more significant role in the previously dominated inter-
state system. Quasi-state, which principally fulfils the cri-
teria of statehood but only misses recognition from oth-
ers, are also becoming more active in various international
affairs for their survival both through vast economic coop-
eration and continuous political engagement. Their pres-
ence, therefore, could no longer be ignored. Moreover,
quasi-state, for their purpose of gaining recognition or due
to their legal exclusion from the international system
(Grzybowski, 2019), often involved in various conflicts with
other parties, many of which are still outstanding and kill
thousands of people. In fact, many of these conflicts are
unsettled or become more complicated as it involves these
quasi-states. Conflict resolution, therefore, requires an
understanding of the behavior of quasi-states.
Take the most evident example, which would also be
the focus of this paper, the South China Sea disputes. The
South China Sea dispute is not as bloody as other con-
flicts involving quasi-states. However, this dispute is among
the most long-standing and contentious debates in South-
east Asia, which have global consequences. First of all, the
South China Sea, as the disputed area is one of the most
important hubs in the global maritime trade route con-
necting the rapidly developed East Asian economies to the
global market. It is estimated that a quarter of the global
maritime trade passes this area each year (Ba, 2011) among
which for exporting half of the global oil and two-third of
the global natural gas (Johnson, 2012). This oil volume,
for comparison, is sixteen times more than those carried
through the Panama Canal, and also one of the busiest
hubs for global maritime trade (Johnson, 2012). It is not
surprising, therefore, that even though the dispute never
peaked into open military confrontation since 1988, the
situation is always contentious with global powers such as
the United States, India, Japan, and Russia also interfer-
ing in the disputes in varying degree. It has not mentioned
the economic significance of this area in relations to its
non-living resources such as oil and natural gas reserve es-
timated to be more than 200 billion barrels (Johnson, 2012)
and living resources in the form of fishing stocks accounted
as much as 12 percent of the total global catch (Greer,
2016).
Second, the dispute is also contentious because China,
the second most powerful state in the world, which is also
regarded as the closest substitute for the declining Ameri-
can power is also a claimant in the dispute. In fact, it is
not only the biggest claimant state in the dispute but also
has the most significant claimed territory. Consequently,
many watch the South China Sea as the test case that has
the potential to alter the balance of power in the region.
Given the above mentioned economic importance of the
South China Sea and its importance for China’s strategic
defence, the prospect of China’s controlling the South
China Sea is an alert for the United States and other mari-
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time powers who have a stake on navigation and sea lane
of communication in this sea. In addition, the dispute is
also a test case for reading typical China’s leadership style
should it be a global power in the future. China’s conduct
in the South China Sea, in this case, is perceived as a test
case to identify if it is a benign rising power that could
manage dispute peacefully with others, or it is a unilateral
assertive power which is likely to interfere its much smaller
neighboring countries surrounding the South China Sea.
In either case, China’s participation in the dispute has
complicated the existing territorial disputes with power
politics which make a confidence-building and dispute
settlement even more difficult.
Based on the above circumstances, it is well understood
that the dispute attracts wide attention with a large num-
ber of pieces of literature mostly focusing on the critical
role of China in shaping the dynamics of the dispute from
its different approach towards other claimants states to its
divisive attitude toward other ASEAN members in the re-
gional dispute management mechanism (Fravel, 2011; Kim,
1998; Thayer, 2012; Goldstein, 2011; Swaine & Fravel,
2011). Other pieces of literatures have also discussed ex-
tensive contrary, that is, how each individual claimant state
and even outside powers deal with China in the dispute
(de Castro, 2009; Sutter, 2010; Thayer, 2011; Buszynski,
2012; Storey, 2008). These vast pieces of literatures, how-
ever, address little about Taiwan, which is, despite its quasi-
state status, also a claimant to the dispute. In one part, it
is reasonable that Taiwan is a small entity, and its claim is
similar to China, and thus no contention occurs with the
most powerful claimant state. Its status as a quasi-state also
implies that it is not recognized as a party to any first track
diplomacy of dispute management in the South China
Sea due to other countries’ adherence to one China Policy.
However, dismissing the importance of Taiwan in the
dispute would undermine the prospect for dispute settle-
ment. First of all, Taiwan, regardless of its quasi-state sta-
tus, is a claimant to the conflict, and thus no dispute settle-
ment would be achieved without Taiwan. Second, Taiwan
has claimed, occupied, and equipped the largest island in
the South China Sea – Itu Aba militarily - and thus, its
position is critical in the negotiation of any maritime de-
limitation in Spratlys (Kuok, 2015). Moreover, it is due to
its large claim in the dispute that Taiwan would take a
necessary measure to defend its claim. Taiwan also has the
second largest fishing fleet in the world (Wang, 2018) which
would not only strengthen Taiwan’s position in defending
its claim in the dispute but also would have the potential
to set the dynamics of the dispute. Taiwan is also backed
by the United States, which would make the dispute more
contentious vis a vis China. Finally, Taiwan is essential as
it is the only actor that could undermine China’s exces-
sive claim in the dispute through its ambiguous nine-
dashed-line map covering the entire South China Sea. It is
this excessive claim and China’s stern position not to clarify
this claim that makes South China dispute more intrac-
table. In this regard, the fact that Taiwan has a similar
claim with China because they argue to be the legitimate
representative of China indicating that Taiwan could un-
dermine China’s claim should it decide to clarify its own
claim in the dispute (Kuok, 2015). However, Taiwan could
also shift the power balance in favor of China should it
decide to align with China in the dispute. In short, Tai-
wan is a strategic player in the South China Sea dispute,
and it is for all these reasons that this research paper aims
to examine Taiwan strategy in the South China Sea dis-
putes as to how Taiwan as a quasi-state conducts diplo-
macy to defend its claim in the South China Sea.
In doing so, this paper is structured in two parts. The
first part is the theoretical framework, where it discusses
the concept of quasi-state and develops an analytical frame-
work for examining the diplomacy of quasi-state. The sec-
ond part is the case study, where it begins to apply this
framework in the case study of Taiwan in the South China
Sea disputes. This section provides the context of the South
China Sea Disputes and Taiwan’s strategic interest in the
dispute and then examines the diplomacy of Taiwan as a
quasi-state in the dispute, which leads to a conclusion. As
it is a case study research, this paper will mainly adopt a
qualitative method to understand better the practice of
diplomacy of a quasi-state in the case of Taiwan. In terms
of the theoretical part, this paper will explore various aca-
demic sources to build on the existing research. Meanwhile,
in terms of the case study part, this paper consults both
primary sources from Taiwan government’s documents and
website and secondary sources from media or academic
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journal articles to enrich the data for the case explana-
tion.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
CONCEPTUALIZING QUASI STATE
The first step of explaining the diplomacy of Taiwan as
a quasi-state would require the development of an analyti-
cal framework for the quasi-state itself. The phrase ‘devel-
opment of analytical framework’ here is intentional, given
that the concept of quasi-state is ill-defined, and no theo-
ries have been developed to explain the diplomacy of quasi-
state. In regards to the former, principally, there is an agree-
ment that quasi-state is a concept to describe entities
counted as “almost states” (Kolsto, 2006). However, schol-
ars differ significantly on which aspects that make them
“almost states”. According to Robert H. Jackson who
coined the term in 1990 through his mostly referred book
on Quasi State entitled “Quasi States: Sovereignty, Inter-
national Relations, and the Third World”, explaining that
quasi-state is entities recognized as states, but it could not
perform its statehood in practice. Here he used the term
quasi-state to describe ex-colonial states in the third world
who gain recognition as independent states after the
decolonization process.  Thus they accept ‘juridical state-
hood’ defined as possessing “the same external rights and
responsibilities like all other sovereign states.” These states,
however, “have not yet been authorized and empowered
domestically and consequently lack institutional features
of sovereign states as also defined by classical international
law” (Jackson, 1990). In other words, these states lack ‘em-
pirical statehood’ whereby the citizens do not enjoy the
benefit of independent states, and the government does
not provide sufficient public goods (Jackson, 1990).
Due to this definition, the concept of quasi-state devel-
oped by Jackson overlaps with the concept of failed states,
which are later becoming more popular. This concept is
also used to include “an entity that aspires to statehood or
fights for a statehood issue, that even controls statehood
functions, but that is not a sovereign state” (Dijxhoorn,
2017) – a definition which also overlaps with the concept
of rebels or separatism. It is for this reason that this paper
adopts the alternative meaning of quasi-state proposed by
Kolsto which principally focuses on to describe the oppo-
site group of the phenomenon that is an entity that has
met criteria for statehood but “lack international recogni-
tion” (Kolsto, 2006). Whether this state in practice is weak
or not is not subject to debate in this definition as its em-
phasis is on the absence or lack of recognition from oth-
ers, which makes the way of these states in pursuing its
interest unique and different from others. This lack of rec-
ognition itself is the result of combination of various fac-
tors, from legal, in which the process leading to the forma-
tion of these states is frequently seen as against the norm
of territorial integrity, to political reason in which it is
against the will of the “parent” state, and recognizing quasi-
state might have political risk for countries which also have
secessionist movements.
Based on this explanation, this definition, therefore, is
similar to what Scott Pegg (Pegg, 1998) refers to as “de
facto states” or what Nina Caspersen refers to as “unrecog-
nized states” (Caspersen, 2012). The first refers to a “seces-
sionist entity that receives popular support and has achieved
sufficient capacity to provide governmental services to a
given population in a defined territorial area, over which
it maintains effective control for an extended period” (Pegg,
1998). Meanwhile, the latter refers to entities that “have
achieved de facto independence, including territorial con-
trol”, “have not gained international recognition”, and
“have demonstrated an aspiration for full, de jure, inde-
pendence” (Caspersen, 2012). The number of this category
of the state itself differs across datasets depending on which
definition they refer to. Caspersen, for example, mentions
there are 17 unrecognized states since 1991 (Caspersen,
2012). Meanwhile, Douglas Lemke’s dataset (Lemke, 2017)
indicates there are 187 de facto states from 1816 to 2010
or 34 countries from 1945-2011, according to Florea’s
dataset (Florea, 2014). Examples of these states, among
others, are Abkhazia, Chechnya, Nagorno Karabakh, South
Ossetia, Somaliland, Transnistria and Taiwan.
The following question is, what is the consequence of
being quasi-state or unrecognized by other states? The ex-
isting literature has extensively discussed the legal circum-
stance of quasi-state in three areas (deLisle, 2011;
Henckaerts, 1996; Dijxhoorn, 2017; Chiang, 2018). First
of all, quasi-states have only limited diplomatic relations
with other states. In the case of Taiwan, the increasing
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power of China, followed by the 1971 UN Resolution
which granted the seat of China in the UNSC to PRC,
has become a turning point for other countries to switch
their diplomatic relations from Taiwan to the PRC. The
only 24 states left to maintain their recognition of Tai-
wan, all of which are not significant global players. By the
continuously rising China’s power in global affairs, other
countries become more reluctant to break their commit-
ment to One China Policy. Consequently, Taiwan could
only maintain modest diplomatic relations with other states
in a less informal way, such as being apparent in their Rep-
resentative Offices instead of Embassies to other countries.
This relation is also mainly to maintain economic ties in
which Taiwan has more leverage as the world’s 15th most
competitive economy in 2017 (Taiwan Today, 2017) and
the fifth-largest foreign exchange reserve holder in 2018
(Central Intelligence Agency, 2018). In countries to which
Taiwan has close relations such as the United States, there
have been special arrangements for compensating and
maintaining bilateral relations. The US government, for
example, has enacted Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) which
stipulates that no changes occur concerning people’s con-
tacts and domestic law resulting from the US switching
commitment to One China Policy (Pegg, 1998).
The second legal circumstance is that quasi-states have
only limited access to international organizations (deLisle,
2011). Quasi-states indeed have access to an international
organization whose members are not exclusive states, such
as WTO, APEC, ICAO, and WHA. However, the largest
and perhaps most crucial international body, that is the
United Nations (UN), along with its agencies is an exclu-
sive state membership that makes quasi-state membership
difficult. Quasi-state indeed could pursue argument dem-
onstrating their statehood or the UN practice, which en-
ables some cases of quasi-states for joining the UN in the
past (de Lisle, 2011). However, in the case of Taiwan, it is
still challenging as it has China in its Security Council,
which is ready to veto against Taiwan membership at any
time of its application. Taiwan’s strategy so far, therefore,
include pursuing non-member status and taking opportu-
nity where possible in any UN treaties and activities (de
Lisle, 2011).
Lastly, concerning this situation, quasi-states also have
limited access to international law, court, and agreement
(Hsieh, 2007). The International Court of Justice, at this
point, is the primary judicial body of the United Nations.
As Pasha L. Hsieh (Hsieh, 2007) pointed out, however, it
has jurisdiction only to members of the ICJ statute in which
Taiwan is not a member and would be very difficult to be
one as it needs a recommendation from the Security Coun-
cil in which China is, again, a member. Taiwan could use
the provision for non-statutory state whereby they could
confer their disputes to ICJ. However, Taiwan has never
used this option to the high risk of losing the case in front
of the most referred Court and that others will follow
(Hsieh, 2007). Hsieh also pointed out that the situation is
slightly different in regards to the Law of the Sea, which is
not an exclusive state membership and Taiwan gains spe-
cial recognition as a fishing entity under this Law. It means
that Taiwan, here, also has access to International Tribu-
nal on the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) as the dispute settle-
ment body of the UNCLOS whenever it has maritime dis-
putes with other states – cases which potentially occur fre-
quently given Taiwan status as among the top ten fishing
industry in the world. However, this strategy, too, has never
been taken for a similar reason.
Under this unique legal circumstance, the most criti-
cal question that is also the focus of this paper is how then
quasi-states conduct quasi diplomacy with other states in
the absence or lack of all those accesses to international
fora and law. Unfortunately, this is the part where the ex-
isting literature is missing. No theory has been developed
to explain the political consequences of this legal circum-
stance to understand the quasi diplomacy of these states
for their survival. In terms of the purpose of this research,
this paper, therefore, develops argument that by perceiv-
ing the common characteristics following the separation
process with the parent state, quasi-states are not only le-
gally weak but also politically weak at least in three impor-
tant ways, such as in relations with its parent state, patron
states, and domestic audience.
First, the quasi-state is weak due to the pressure from
the parent states. The parent state here is defined as the
state that was left by the quasi-state and still pursues unifi-
cation with the quasi-state. Parent state, in this regard, is
the most vocal in opposing international recognition of
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the quasi-state, as can be seen in most cases of the forma-
tion of quasi-state, such as China’s pressure to Taiwan,
Serbia’s pressure to Kosovo, and Georgia’s pressure to
Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In terms of power relations,
however, the parent state is more powerful than the quasi-
state because, as a sovereign state, the parent state accepts
recognition, rights, and status similar to other sovereign
states. As mentioned earlier, quasi-state emerged from a
secessionist movement of the parent state, and thus prin-
cipally, it is against the internationally accepted norm of
territorial integrity. In international society, therefore, the
status of the quasi-state is weak, and the parent state could
conduct diplomacy to prolong this quasi status by press-
ing other states not to grant any recognition to this seces-
sionist state. This extreme case of this circumstance is when
the parent state has an international reputation, such as
China, who happens to be the permanent member of the
UNSC, and thus, the country has the power to veto
Taiwan’s membership. In addition, the parent state, as it
is previously the one that has a monopoly over the legiti-
mate use of violence, is also stronger militarily compared
to the quasi-state. Therefore, parent states often threaten
to use force to gain the quasi-state back to their integral
territory. Again, the extreme case is when the parent state
is also powerful compared to other states, and thus other
countries would think twice to go against the will of the
parent state.
Second, the quasi-state is also weak due to the pressure
from the patron states. Patron states here are defined as
states who provide security umbrella or political support
for the quasi-state. The quasi-state is weak in this regard
because, in exchange for this support, the quasi-state needs
to align its policies with that of taken by the patron states.
By perceiving the limited recognition and diplomatic rela-
tions available to quasi-state, the patron state is a valuable
partner that needs to be maintained. In the case of Tai-
wan, for example, its patron state could be perceived to be
the United States. Although US-RoC Mutual Defense
Treaty ended in 1980 after the US normalized its diplo-
matic relations with the PRC, the United States contin-
ued its cooperation with Taiwan under the framework of
Taiwan Relations Act in which the US mentioned that it
would “consider any effort to determine the future of Tai-
wan by other than peaceful means…will make available to
Taiwan such defense article and defense services in such
quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to main-
tain a sufficient self-defense capability” (Huang, 2010). This
article, therefore, maintains the US security umbrella for
Taiwan as enhanced by continuous arm sale, joint mili-
tary cooperation, and bilateral defense talk.
Finally, the quasi-state is weak due to pressure from the
domestic audience. The status of quasi-state is dilemmatic
and divisive among the domestic audiences since it leads
to two or more open-ended results, whether it gives up its
struggle and returns to the parent state or continues to
fight for international recognition. Any foreign policy to-
ward the first end will meet the opposition of the inde-
pendence group and vice versa. Pressure from the domes-
tic audiences would tend to be higher in the case of demo-
cratic states facing territorial disputes. It is due to nature
of territorial conflicts which tend to provoke nationalism
among the domestic audience to defend the disputed ter-
ritory and the nature of democratic states in which inter-
state dispute is more visible to local audience through the
availability of information for the public (Putnam, 1998;
Goddard, 2010; Fearon, 1994; Pertiwi, 2014). Besides, there
might be an argument that political weakness, as men-
tioned above, could also occur in any recognized state.
However, the occurrence is not by the system, indicating
that it is not as persistent as those faced by quasi-states.
Also, pressures for recognized states from the international
level tend to vary depending on the issue. Meanwhile, the
major pressure for quasi-states at all times is from the par-
ent and the patron states.
Following these legal and political consequences, which
all lead to the legal and political weaknesses of quasi-state,
the diplomacy of quasi-state, consequently, would be more
or less similar to the diplomacy of weak states. First of all,
in response to the legal weaknesses in which quasi-states
have limited access to most first track diplomacy, quasi-
states would be a type of actor that would utilize multi-
track diplomacy to gain maximum benefit. Multitrack di-
plomacy refers to the diplomacy strategy which is not only
conducted officially between government to government
or in the so-called first track but also unofficially, in the
so-called non-first track. John McDonald suggests that there
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are nine possible tracks, but they are often simplified to be
two tracks, in which the second covers all informal tracks
from one and a half (partly formal with participation both
from government and non-government actors), second
track to third track (Chigas, 2003). In principle, multi-
track diplomacy is used in the complex dispute in which
first track diplomacy stalled, and parties need another av-
enue that is more open and less judgmental to maintain
communication channel and to exchange more in-depth
perspective in their capacity instead of as government rep-
resentative which subject to many constraints (Chigas,
2003).
Meanwhile, in response to the political weaknesses, IR
literature has extensively discussed the diplomacy of weak
states, which could be categorized into several categories.
The classical IR theories suggested that weak states could
adopt balancing or bandwagoning strategy. Balancing re-
fers to the approach to “balance against a perceived poten-
tial adversary either internally by shifting resource alloca-
tions to strengthen its defensive capability, or externally,
by cooperating with another state that fears the same po-
tential adversary” (Roy, 2005). Bandwagoning, on the con-
trary, refers to state strategy to align “with the threatening
country to avoid being attacked by it” (Walt, 1987; Roy,
2005). However, more recent literature, drawing from non-
western states’ experiences, argues that weak states also
have the option for hedging. Hedging refers to the strategy
“to enable states to deal with uncertainties in their part-
ner’ future behavior by relying on a basket of policy tools
that, while helping to promote bilateral cooperation, also
entails competitive” elements aimed at preparing them-
selves against potential security threats posed by their part-
ners (Hiep, 2013). In essence, hedging is a strategy to keep
“open more than one strategic option against the possibil-
ity of a future security threat (Roy, 2005). Hedging is com-
monly done by “establishing links with other large outside
powers as counterweights” or by engaging the threatening
power in international institutions (Roy, 2005). By per-
ceiving the minimal options possessed by quasi-state, hedg-
ing is a more favorable option. As summarized in a model,
therefore, the diplomacy of quasi-state could be seen as
follows:
Figure 1. The Model of the diplomacy of Quasi State (Modified from various sources. See: deLisle, 2011;
Henckaerts, 1996; Dijxhoorn, 2017; Chiang, 2018; Chigas, 2003; Roy, 2005; Walt, 1987).
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RESULT AND DISCUSSION
THE CASE STUDY OF TAIWAN IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA
Concerning the analytical framework of the diplomacy
of the quasi-state explained above, this part will begin ap-
plying the model to the case study of Taiwan in the South
China Sea disputes by explaining the context of the South
China Sea disputes firstly. As mentioned earlier, South
China Sea disputes are among the most contentious dis-
putes in Southeast Asia. This dispute involves five states
(Malaysia, Brunei Darussalam, Vietnam, the Philippines,
and China) and one quasi-state, Taiwan, over the semi-
enclosed sea surrounded by these states. The South China
Sea consists of four main islands, i.e., the Spratlys, Paracels,
Macclesfield Bank, and Pratas Islands. Some people in
states claim partly or wholly the land features of the South
China Sea, while others claim these features together with
the surrounding waters. The basis for this claim itself var-
ies across parties, in which some based their claim on geo-
graphical proximity while some other based on historical
evidence. In either case, the strategic importance of the
South China Sea, as mentioned earlier, has made the dis-
pute more complicated. The South China Sea is not only
crucial for its symbolic reason as part of states’ claimed
national territory but also its economic and strategic rea-
sons.
The South China Sea dispute first erupted in 1974,
when China occupied the Paracels islands amid the Cold
War (Fravel, 2008; Garver, 1992). China feared that So-
viet-supported by North Vietnam would seize the Paracels,
and thus made the first move to grab the islands. The de-
teriorating relations between the two, the oil crisis, and
the UN call for maritime delimitation along with the de-
velopment of the UNCLOS resulted in another clash in
1988 (Pertiwi, 2014). There had been an unofficial regional
initiative by the Indonesian government in collaboration
with Canadian International Developmental Agency
(CIDA) to create Workshop on Managing Potential Con-
flicts in the South China Sea (WMPC-SCS) in 1990 to
facilitate track two diplomacy among claimant states in
the South China Sea. This workshop was successful in
pushing ASEAN to adopt Declaration on the South China
Sea, declaring ASEAN position in the dispute and its call
for peaceful means, self-restraint, and cooperation among
disputants. This workshop was also successful in bringing
together China and Taiwan in the same table for continu-
ous dialogue in the dispute. However, by the withdrawal
of the US from the Philippines and that China became
more powerful, another incident occurred in which China
made the first move to the Philippines’ claimed Mischief
Reef in 1995. As a response, ASEAN issued the Declara-
tion on the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea
agreed in 2002 in which China was a party. While this
declaration has contributed to the relative peace since 2002
with states continue working in translating the declara-
tion into Code of Conduct, the rise of China and the UN
call for submission of maritime delimitation of continen-
tal shelf have increased the tension in the disputed area
along with countries competing to submit their claim to
the UN and reinforcing their presence in the disputed ter-
ritory. The tension peaked in the standoff in the
Scarborough shoal between China and the Philippines in
2012. While no open military confrontation occurred,
many recognized the different dynamics in the dispute since
this period owing to the rising power of China which wid-
ened the power asymmetry among disputants, increased
misperception and distrust, and provoked other regional
powers to interfere in the disputes.
With the complexity of the dispute and the significant
role of China, Taiwan’s participation in the dispute is in-
teresting as to why small quasi-state such as Taiwan main-
tains its claim in the dispute and how it survives the dis-
pute. First of all, Taiwan has a strategic interest in the dis-
pute. As a party claiming to be the legitimate representa-
tive of China, Taiwan’s claim in the South China Sea is
similar with that of mainland China, in which they based
its claim on the Location Map of the South China Sea
Islands issued by Taiwan when it was still in power in main-
land China in 1947 (Wang, 2010). This map illustrated
the South China Sea area as bounded by the 11 dashed
line up to four degrees north latitude (Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, 2016). After the end of the Civil War along with
the PRC taking over the government in the mainland,
China under the PRC, continued its claim based on this
map only by eliminating two lines in the Gulf of Tonkin
and then making it a nine-dashed line (Kuok, 2015). The
map itself was the result of the historical records far back
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beyond 200 BC of the Han Dynasty which has sent a del-
egation to the area and other historical records demon-
strating fishermen activities in the area. The reference of
this map is among the most debated issue in the dispute
as it covers almost the entire South China Sea and thus
overlaps with all territories claimed by other states. Both
Taiwan and China never clarify what they mean with the
dashed line. Many also criticize the claim as also problem-
atic as it is based on historical records instead of interna-
tional law. Regardless of this debate, however, one crucial
point is that both China and Taiwan defend their claimed
territory because, in their version, it has been part of their
integral territory since ancient times. In its official docu-
ment, Taiwan asserted that islands in the South China
Sea “were first discovered by the ancient Chinese”, “were
firstly named by the Chinese people and government”,
“were firstly used by the ancient Chinese”, “were first in-
corporated into national territory by the early Chinese”,
and “were first administered by the early Chinese” (Minis-
try of Foreign Affairs, 2016). Thus, as the legitimate repre-
sentative of China, Taiwan has to maintain this claim as
the symbol of its sovereignty and territorial integrity. It is
well understood as theories on territorial disputes demon-
strate that territorial dispute is among the most conten-
tious dispute and often leads to war since it is related to
territorial attachment which often provokes nationalism
among domestic audiences (Diehl & Goertz, 1988). Some
even argue further that it is the nature of humans as verte-
brates to claim territory (Senese & Vasquez, 2003; Vasquez,
1993). Therefore, no matter how small the disputed terri-
tory and how weak the claimant state is, it would tend to
defend their claimed territory.
However, sovereignty is not the only factor behind
Taiwan’s claim. Geopolitics, military, economic, and do-
mestic factors also matter. Ian Easton (Easton, 2016) has
highlighted the strategic positions of the South China Sea
for Taiwan. Currently, Taiwan has occupied over Pratas
and Itu Aba. These two islands have contributed to
Taiwan’s defense interest. According to Easton, “Pratas
Island is an excellent location to monitor key PLA units
which could threaten Taiwan’s security and Itu Aba be-
cause it offers Taiwan the ability to observe Chinese air
and naval movements through the distant reaches of the
South China Sea” (Easton, 2016a). Taiwan’s presence in
the South China Sea could not be separated from its inter-
national status itself. Taiwan’s national security and sover-
eignty are threatened due to its sovereignty conflict with
the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Therefore, any
military activities conducted by the PRC should be moni-
tored and reported to the U.S. Since Pratas, and Itu Aba
have strategic locations, these two islands contributed to
the safety and sovereignty of Taiwan. Moreover, Easton also
pointed out the economic significance of the South China
Sea for Taiwan. It works as markets and suppliers in Eu-
rope and the Middle East for Taiwan (Easton, 2016). Tai-
wan imported more than 90 percent of its oil from the
Middle East, and thus Taiwan was not only interested in
securing freedom of navigation in the disputed area, but
also exploring potential oil resources in its claimed terri-
tory. Finally, Taiwan, as the world’s major fish-producing
country, also has interests in the rich fishing ground in
the area.
THE DIPLOMACY OF TAIWAN AS A QUASI-STATE IN THE SOUTH
CHINA SEA DISPUTE
By possessing these strategic interests in the dispute,
Taiwan needs to conduct diplomacy to secure its strategic
interests in the South China Sea. However, its status as a
quasi-state implies that it has legal and political weaknesses
in which it not only has limited access to international law
and other first track mechanisms, but it also faces pres-
sures from parent-state, patron state, and domestic audi-
ence. The diplomacy of Taiwan as a quasi-state to deal with
the legal weaknesses in this regard would include maxi-
mizing the small opportunities in the first track and ex-
ploit other opportunities in the second track in a strategy
called multitrack diplomacy. In dealing with political weak-
nesses, Taiwan would have the option to adopt a hedging
strategy. The combination of this strategy would be ex-
plained as follows.
THE TAIWAN’S FIRST TRACK DIPLOMACY
The first track of diplomacy involves government par-
ticipation through formal bilateral and multilateral forums
to solve potential conflicts. In this case, Taiwan’s diplo-
macy could be categorized into two strategies: one being
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strategic to deal with legal weaknesses and the other being
strategic to deal with political weakness.
Legally, Taiwan still has access to UNCLOS and its ju-
dicial body, ITLOS. However, its political weaknesses,
mainly resulting from the pressure of the parent states,
leave Taiwan limited access to international and regional
first track mechanism, such as ASEAN related meetings,
Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China
Sea (DoC), cooperation such as Joint Seismic Undertak-
ing between China-Vietnam-the Philippines (JMSU), and
even bilateral diplomacy with other claimant states due to
other’s adherence to One China Policy. Taiwan, however,
needs to demonstrate its resolve in the dispute if it aims to
maintain its existence in an international level and if it
seeks to demonstrate its sovereignty over the claimed terri-
tory. Pressure from domestic audiences over the ruling
government to defend its claimed territory also increases
the necessity for Taiwan to maintain its presence in the
dispute. Taiwan’s strategy in this context is the compro-
mise between self-restraint and its effort to reinforce its
claim in the dispute. It results in Taiwan’s dominant poli-
cies which tend to be in the forms of statements rather
than actions, and also reaction rather than provocation. It
could be seen clearly in particular after Taiwan occupied
Itu Aba and equipped the islands with military installa-
tion, and then Taiwan made no further move in the dis-
putes.
Amidst the rising tensions between Vietnam and China
in the Spratly in 1988, Taiwan created national task force
which led to the issuance of the 1993 Policy Guidelines
for the South China Sea which reemphasized its claim that
the four islands and the historic water limit belonged to
Taiwan and that it was willing to cooperate with other claim-
ant states for the dispute management and maritime co-
operation in the area (Kao, 2014a). After the Mischief Reef
incident and other states’ responses to it by enhancing
their presence in their claimed territory, Taiwan clearly
stated that it would not increase its military presence in
the disputed area (Kao, 2014). Instead, Taiwan adopted
the Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone
of the ROC and the Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone
and the Continental Shelf of the ROC in January 1998
(Hickey, 2016). Taiwan strongly opposed it when Malaysia
occupied Investigator Shoal and Erica Reef in 1999, but
again it was delivered in an official statement and domes-
tic legislation to reiterate its baseline of the territorial sea
(Lu). Similar policy was adopted when tension arose in
2009 along with Malaysia and Vietnam making joint sub-
mission of their continental shelf to the UN, and later
Taiwan demonstrated its resolve through official statement
by MOFA reemphasizing that the four islands chain and
the surrounding waters belong to Taiwan and that “any
sovereignty claims over or occupation of these islands un-
der any reason or any means by any other country shall be
null and void” (Lu). By the continued tension in the South
China Sea which peaked in the standoff between China
and the Philippines and Taiwan was still excluded from
any diplomatic processes, Taiwan decided to play a more
significant role as an honest broker in the dispute by pro-
posing a South China Sea Peace Initiative which princi-
pally promoted the principles of “safeguarding sovereignty,
shelving disputes, pursuing peace and reciprocity, and pro-
moting cooperation” among states in the dispute (Minis-
try of Foreign Affairs, 2016). This initiative is quite similar
to the East China Sea Initiative that was also offered by
Ma. The roadmap of this initiative consists of three stages:
“In the short term, jointly shelving the disputes and launch-
ing multilateral dialogue and consultations, integrated plan-
ning in the midterm; and over the long term, the establish-
ment of zonal development through bilateral or multilateral
cooperation through bilateral or multilateral cooperation lead-
ing to fair and reciprocal win-win results.” (Ministry of For-
eign Affairs, 2016).
This initiative seemed to be the most salient effort made
by Taiwan to be listened to and existed among other states
while maintaining self-restraint. This initiative has earned
some success with Taiwan, and the Philippines later signed
“Agreement Concerning the Facilitation of Cooperation
on Law Enforcement,” which in principle shelved their
bilateral disputes and developed fisheries cooperation. It
also set up guidelines among the two in favor of address-
ing maritime disputes. Both have overlapping claims over
their EEZ. Thus, to provide a legal framework for capacity
building and conflict resolution, this bilateral agreement
might support Taiwan’s weak status. While other impacts
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need to be identified, this initiative was evidence of
Taiwan’s strategy in dealing with its legal weaknesses. One
substantial blowback for Taiwan’s legal weakness, however,
was the recent International Arbitration ruling over the
dispute between China and the Philippines. Although
Taiwan was not a party to the ruling, similar claim between
China and Taiwan made the arbitration issue its ruling on
Itu Aba stating that it is not an island, but a rock, and thus
it could not be entitled maritime zone. Although it has
provoked a strong protest from Taiwan on the same day of
the announcement of the ruling, Taiwan’s legal weakness
hindered it to lodge a formal protest and propose its case
in formal processes. Thus, to demonstrate its resolve, Presi-
dent Ma made a historical visit to Taiping Island in 2016.
It marked a strong claim that this area was not just a “rock”
but an “island” reversing arguments from the Philippines
(Jing, 2016).
Taiwan’s diplomacy strategy is not only a result of its
legal weakness in which it needs to compromise its legal
weakness and its necessity to defend the claimed territory,
but also a result of its political defects in which it also
needs to compromise the pressure from parent state, China,
the pressure from the patron state, the United States, and
the pressure from domestic audience. Taiwan’s strategy, in
this context, imitates a hedging strategy. To elaborate the
case, pressure from the parent state, China, was not only
in the form of pushing other countries to adhere to One
China Policy, but also in the way of its repeated call for
cooperation with Taiwan in the dispute. As parties claim-
ing to be representative of China, both China and Taiwan
must maintain a similar claim and position in the dispute.
In its call, China asserted that safeguarding the country’s
sovereignty and territorial integrity as well as the overall
interests of the Chinese nation should be a common obli-
gation of compatriots of the two sides” (Tiezzi, 2014). This
call has undeniably created domestic pressure between
groups supporting and against cross-strait cooperation. The
two main parties, DPP and KMT differed significantly on
this issue, which adds to domestic tension (Kao, 2014).
Externally, this call also created a domino effect in the
form of US pressure as Taiwan’s patron state in this re-
gard. The United States is not a party to the dispute, but
as a global maritime power, it has a stake on the freedom
of navigation in the South China Sea. Along with China’s
Excessive claim in the dispute, the US has repeatedly called
for China’s clarification on the nine-dashed line and en-
sured China abide by the UNCLOS. In this regard, the
US pressed Taiwan to clarify its claim in the dispute and
follow international law in the hope that this departing
position would undermine China’s claim (Kuok, 2015).
These multidirectional pressures have led Taiwan to opt
for a more open option in the form of hedging. On the
one hand, Taiwan seems to band-wagon to China as its
main priority is to maintain cross-strait relations. Although
it will vary depending on which party leading the govern-
ment, the divisiveness of this issue makes extreme changes
less likely. Moreover, Taiwan, again, has a similar claim
with China. On the other hand, Taiwan also balances
against China through its internal and external balancing
with the United States. The balancing act is more of the
result of domestic pressure from those advocating for more
independent Taiwan and pressure from the US as Taiwan’s
closest ally.
The bandwagoning act could be seen in Taiwan’s con-
sistent policy for being silent and tranquil in response to
China’s behaviour in the South China Sea. Upon the
Mischief Reef incident and subsequent China’s move in
the disputed area, Taiwan made no protest about it. How-
ever, when Malaysia occupied Erica, followed by Vietnam
and the Philippines, which strengthened the position in
the disputed area, Taiwan made a strong protest and rein-
forced its claim in the dispute (MOFA, 1997; MOFA,
1999). Similarly, when China continuously developed ar-
tificial islands in the disputed area, Taiwan defended it by
stating that “international law does not forbid such ac-
tions” (Hickey, 2016). However, when Vietnam and Ma-
laysia made a joint submission to the UN, Vietnam issued
its law on the sea. Nonetheless, when the Philippines re-
named the South China Sea to the West Philippines Sea,
Taiwan “expresses its serious concern and firm opposition”
and “rejects such moves” (MOFA, 2009; MOFA, 2012;
MOFA, 2013). Taiwan, however, was not purely
bandwagoning to China. The pressure from the US and
domestic audience have pushed Taiwan to keep some dis-
tance from China. The US called for Taiwan to clarify its
claim and internal demand from pro-independent groups
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which have contributed to Taiwan’s balancing act. While
Taiwan maintains self-restraint policy by demonstrating its
presence through its statement instead of action, it could
be perceived as the shifting tone of Taiwan’s statement
from the 1990s to the present. From the beginning of the
dispute, Taiwan’s claim is exactly similar to China empha-
sizing its claim in the entire South China Sea and that its
claim is based on historic water noted in historical evi-
dence. In its statement, Taiwan’s claim is as follows:
 “In terms of history, geography, international law, and facts,
the Nansha Islands [Spratly Islands], Shisha Islands [Paracel
Islands], Changsha Islands [Macclesfield Islands], Tungsha
Islands [Pratas Islands] are part of inherent territory of the
Republic of China; the sovereignty over those islands belongs
to the Republic of China. The South China Sea area within
the historic water limit is the maritime area under the juris-
diction of the Republic of China, where the Republic of China
possesses all rights and interests.” (Alfred Hu, Nien-Tsu &
McDorman, Ted L, 2013, p.64).
This statement was repeated in each response to other
claimants’ activities in the disputed area. However, along
with the US pressure to clarify its claim and the shifting
power in the government, Taiwan’s claim has shifted by
no more emphasizing the historical base. It stated repeat-
edly that “The Spratly Islands [Nansha Islands,
WS™l£nö\], Paracel Islands [Xisha Islands, n‰™l£nö\],
Macclesfield Bank [Zhongsha Islands, -N™l£nö\] and the
Pratas Islands [Dongsha Islands, qg™l£nö\], as well as their
surrounding waters, are inherent parts of Republic of
China [ROC] territory” (Kuok, 2015) whether it indicates
that Taiwan began to base its claim on UNCLOS as it
always states to be remained being studied. The latest de-
velopment, however, concerning the International Arbi-
tration ruling system reveals that Taiwan is clearer in its
position not to cooperate with China, even when the rul-
ing system disadvantages Taiwan on the status of Itu Aba.
THE TAIWAN’S SECOND TRACK DIPLOMACY
The second track diplomacy focuses on the tracks out-
side the government parties. The variable might vary de-
pending on the purpose of the state’s goal. This paper
classified the second track diplomacy with the indication
that Taiwan can utilize it apart from the government’s track.
This track is essential for Taiwan as a quasi-state, in which
the country has been excluded from any official dialogue
discussing South China Sea issues. In the management
conflict, the role of the second track diplomacy might help
bridge the barriers that could not be solved through the
government’s channels. It stressed the role of third-party
that might come in various forms.
For Taiwan, second track diplomacy has different char-
acteristics. In the past, Taiwan tended to co-opt NGOs to
speak for government interests. However, in the present,
Taiwan prefers to characterize its diplomacy as people-to-
people diplomacy (minjian waijiao) as it gives more free-
dom for the non-state actors to build network horizontally
and internationally with other non-state and state actors
(Lang, 2014). This paradigm shift is the result of Taiwan’s
focus on increasing representativeness at the international
level and its effort in reducing problems of interstate rela-
tions as a quasi-state. In this sense, the government plays
its role by cooperating with the NGOs through assistant-
ship or authorization on areas under consideration (Lang,
2014). Regarding South China Sea disputes, Taiwan seems
to employ both the past and present second track diplo-
macy. The first could be perceived in the adoption of the
first and half-track diplomacy, where the government fa-
cilitates the involvement and participation of non-state
actors in the South China Sea discussion forums. Mean-
while, the second could be perceived in the more inde-
pendent involvement of Taiwan’s civil society organization
in the South China Sea discussion.
The first one and half-track diplomacy is the Workshop
on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea
(WMPC-SCS). WMPC-SCS is not Taiwan’s initiated dis-
cussion forum. Yet, it is among the initial forums which
give the only space for Taiwan’s involvement in discussing
the dispute, and Taiwan has taken this opportunity to par-
ticipate actively in the forum. WMPC SCS was initiated
by Indonesian diplomat, Hasyim Djalal in 1989 aiming to
manage potential conflicts through dialogue and mecha-
nism of cooperation and exploration between the claim-
ants (Song, 2010a). The workshop invited scholars and
governments from disputed countries, and their presence
counted as personal or private rather than official repre-
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sentatives. Therefore, Taiwan has partaken the forum since
1991, together with delegations from China. Since Taiwan
was excluded from any formal dialogue mechanism,
WMPC-SCS helped serve Taiwan’s interest and voice in
South China Sea disputes. This forum was not designed
to resolve the conflict but rather, to create a sense of com-
munity by managing the disputes through cooperation and
confidence-building measure (Song, 2010). Although ten-
sion came on and off, the workshop at least contributed
to common understanding among disputed countries re-
garding the importance of the South China Sea. The most
significant milestone that has been reached with China
and Taiwan participation is both sides agree to work to-
gether and come up with a joint SCS project proposal,
namely The China-Taiwan South-East Asia Network for
Education and Training (SEA-NET) which was adopted
on 2009 (Song, 2010). This achievement shows the signifi-
cance of the second track diplomacy for less powerful states
such as Taiwan to preserve its strategic interests and at least
to maintain its involvement in dispute management.
WMPC-SCS, however, could not be the only second track
diplomacy for Taiwan in the South China Sea. Regardless
of the achievement mentioned above, there is still any limi-
tation for Taiwan to maneuver in the meeting with China,
which banned Taiwan from hosting any related meeting
to the workshop (Li, 2016a).
It is for this reason that in 2015, President Ma Ying-
jeou announced the South China Sea Peace Initiative
(SCSPI). In addition to being the first track diplomacy,
this initiative gave room for non-state actors to participate
in the various cooperation initiatives. In essence, SCSPI
calls for claimants to perform self-restraint, respect inter-
national law, shelving sovereignty dispute, and cooperate
in maritime resources, environment, scientific research,
transnational crime, and disaster relief (Li, 2016). This
initiative was Taiwan’s successful East Asia Peace Initia-
tive, which could bring the disputants to cooperate in fish-
eries areas. This initiative was perceived to offer a fewer
risk for claimant states compared to other actions that have
been developed to manage the dispute in the South China
Sea. However, the progress and implementation of this
initiative remained to be identified. At this point, SCSPI
is a case of how Taiwan made efforts to enlarge its partici-
pation through the second track diplomacy.
The more independent second track diplomacy used
by Taiwan might be able to be perceived in academic fo-
rums such as the International Law Association, Ameri-
can Society in International Law (ILA-ASIL) and Asia-Pa-
cific Research Forum, for instance. This forum generally
aims for the development of international law, although it
does not explicitly address the issue of the South China
Sea like WMPC. Nevertheless, it is also useful as a stage
for discussing the aspect of international law from disputed
issues through academic and scholarly exchanges. It is also
in ILA-ASIL Asia Pacific Research Forum convened in
Taipei in 2015 that President Ma introduced this South
China Sea Peace Initiative Roadmap explained above (Jing,
2016).
CONCLUSION
Based on the current findings, this research concludes
that there is a particular pattern of how quasi-state con-
ducts diplomacy in an international dispute resulting from
its certain circumstances. By using the theoretical frame-
work of quasi-state, it is apparent that quasi-state suffers
from both legal and political weaknesses including lim-
ited access to an international organization, limited access
to an international agreement, and insufficient recogni-
tion from other states. Meanwhile, the latter includes pres-
sure from parent-states, pressure from patron states, and
pressure from the domestic audience. To deal with the first
weakness, quasi-state has dominantly demonstrated multi-
track diplomacy as its strategy to other states in interna-
tional disputes. It indicates that a quasi-state prefers to
maximize its non-first track diplomacy to represent its po-
sition and achieve its interest. In the case of Taiwan, the
adoption of multitrack diplomacy appears, for example,
in its participation in the WMPC-SCS. This research, how-
ever, found that even in the second track diplomacy, Tai-
wan still encounters a severe challenge when it comes to
dealing with China or when it wants to transfer this initia-
tive to the first track diplomacy. Meanwhile, to deal with
the second weakness, the quasi-state has dominantly
adopted hedging strategy, which indicates the cooperation
with the more significant power to protect its interest rather
than fighting against it. Hedging, in this sense, is conducted
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by Taiwan in its relations with the United States. By ob-
serving this trend and revealing the fact that quasi-state
requires support from as many states as possible, this pa-
per suggests that Taiwan could also initiate closer relations
with other sympathetic countries or other quasi-states in
addition to its parent and patron-states.
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